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ABSTRACT

HAMMERING SQUARE PEGS INTO ROUND HOLES: INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AND THE FLAWED ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF
MODERNITY

Justin Pack
Department of Sociology
Master of Science

Despite the increase in awareness of the plight of the third world and NGOs
attempting to deal with poverty, international development projects continue to be
alarmingly hit and miss. The problematic effectiveness of international development has
led to an intense theoretical debate seeking to examine what exactly leads some projects
awry. These criticisms often focus on the fundamental assumptions that underlie
international development projects and occasionally relate them to the epistemological
and ontological assumptions of modernity.
In this thesis, I use Heidegger and Nietzsche to deepen the criticism of the
epistemological and ontological assumptions of modernity that in turn support the most
common approaches to international development. Often these assumptions are so
fundamental to western, scientific thinking that they are not apparent and left

unarticulated. By making the water the fish swims in more transparent to the fish, I
encourage a more flexible, even “fuzzy” approach. The thesis thus seeks to undermine
the confidence in the methods developed in modernity in order to replace the abstract
models and harmful universal approaches with sensitive, local oriented development
projects.
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INTRODUCTION
According to William Easterly (2007: 4), we are witnessing two tragedies related
to poverty. The first is so well known it risks becoming cliché: the suffering of the poor.
Everyone has seen the emaciated children in Africa, the hungry faces in Asia and the
frustrated in Latin America. Easterly argues there is no lack of people, businesses and
countries willing to help, trying to get rid of poverty. Governments, businesses and NGOs
are all seeking ways to improve the condition of the impoverished. And yet, and this is
the second tragedy, for all the “well-meaning compassion,” development efforts can’t
seem to fix the problem. It is not a matter of a lack of awareness or lack of effort. As
Easterly puts it: “This is the tragedy in which the West spent $2.3 trillion on foreign aid
over the last five decades and still had not managed to get twelve-cent medicines to
children to prevent half of all malaria related deaths” (2007: 4).
The second tragedy of poverty is that too much of the aid that is going to help is
being mismanaged. Medicines end up on the black market, in the wrong hands, or lost in
bureaucracy. Wherever it ends up, often it isn’t getting where it needs to. And so, despite
the great desire to help, the aid often doesn’t arrive to the right people at the right time.
According to Easterly, there are two types of approaches to development projects
and international aid: Planners and Searchers. Planners create a goal oriented plan that is
implemented, often without adequate feedback and accountability (2007:15). Searchers
don’t use a plan at all. They enter a situation, attempt to understand it, and move forward
with flexible solutions that are sensitive to local conditions. Planners tend to be academic
and bureaucratic. Searchers are more akin to probing market researchers. Planners
approach aid efforts like a “technical engineering problem” (2007: 6), while Searchers
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take a more flexible approach that recognizes the complexity of the situation. “A Planner
believes outsiders know enough to impose solutions. A Searcher believes only insiders
have enough knowledge to find solutions…” (2007:6).
Not surprisingly, Easterly’s The White Man’s Burden aims to show the problems
of the approach of Planners and to outline what can be done to encourage development
projects to emulate Searchers and not Planners. The White Man’s Burden is subtitled:
Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. While
some might deny things are as bleak as Easterly implies, there is no doubt that much
could be done to fix what he calls the second tragedy of poverty. Easterly is not alone in
pointing out the problematic orchestration of development projects, James C. Scott
argues something very similar in Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve
the Human Condition Have Failed. Like Easterly, Scott (1998) argues that there are
major problems in international development that are causing the disconnect between
real, impoverished people and the planners who seek to help them. Easterly, however, is
less interested in examining why there is a bias in Western thought that leads to favoring
Planner approaches than proving that they are not working and offering pragmatic
solutions. The last thing he wants to do is spend more time in the ivory tower debating
how we got this way—an appropriate response given his purpose. Scott, on the other
hand, does seek to examine the deeply entrenched assumptions about the nature of
knowledge and reality that inform the Planner approach. His discussion implicates not
only international development, but the social sciences more broadly. This is not
surprising, as social scientists were those called on to help organize and implement many
international development projects. Easterly seeks to fix international development. Scott
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expands the argument and deepens it: social problems require a kind of practical
knowledge that is currently undervalued in the social sciences and international
development in favor of a Planner approach that problematically mimics the physical
sciences. Like Easterly, for Scott, to improve both international development and the
social sciences requires moving away from the kind of Planning methods to a more
flexible approach that is sensitive to local knowledge. Such an approach requires a
different epistemology and ontology.

Roughly the same argument was made 50 years ago about the social sciences. In
1959, C. Wright Mills (1959: 132) declared sociology was sick. According to Mills, the
healthy comparative and historical sociology inspired by Marx, Weber and Mead had
been gradually replaced by a “bureaucratic social science” engaged in human resource
management. This was the same rise of the Planners in the social sciences that Easterly
and Scott see still affecting international development 50 years later. Mills argues this
“new practicality is an academic response to a greatly increased demand for
administrative technicians who will deal with ‘human relations,’ and for new
justifications of corporate business as a system of power” (1959: 96). Those in charge,
Planners, recruited social scientists for what Easterly calls the “Big Plan” (2007: 18). The
need for human resource managers flattered sociologists, lifting them from a nascent and
marginal discipline to the lofty and powerful positions as scientific advisors to the king
(1959: 180). Sociologists now found that they were in great demand to help predict and
control.
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For Mills, this amounts to an abdication by sociology of its social and moral
responsibilities. Instead of the publicly engaged sociology of Marx, Weber and Mead, the
bureaucratic ethos infiltrating sociology removes it from the public sphere into “nondemocratic areas of society—a military establishment, a corporation, an advertising
agency, an administrative division of government” (1959: 114). The bureaucratic ethos
fits perfectly with the desire to emulate the natural sciences. It allows sociologists to
focus on narrow problems (defined by the institution the sociologist is working for),
isolate variables, and find solutions, and provides the prestige of working on the Big
Plan. Unfortunately, under these conditions “social science itself often tends to become a
functionally rational machine; the individual social scientist tends to lose his moral
autonomy and his substantive rationality, and the role of human reason in human affairs
tends to become merely a refinement of techniques for administrative and manipulative
uses” (1959: 180).
Following Weber, Mills argues academics can no longer afford to naively accept
the grandiose promises of science inherited from the Enlightenment: “Science, it turns
out, is not a technological Second Coming. That its techniques and its rationality are
given a central place in a society does not mean that men live reasonably and without
myth, fraud and superstition. Universal education may lead to technological idiocy and
nationalist provinciality—rather than to the informed and independent intelligence”
(1959: 168). The social sciences become subservient to the undemocratic Big Plan and
lose or never gain the kind of sensitivity needed to respond to local conditions that is
needed for more effective development projects.
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Mills wrote The Sociological Imagination to critique the rising bureaucratic ethos
in sociology and to encourage a return to the historical and comparative roots of
sociology. He hoped sociology would pull back from becoming the pseudo-scientific
force supporting the status quo and return to its previous role as defender of democracy
and servant of the public sphere.
Mills argues a bureaucratic sociology that emulates the natural sciences uses
methods that are not always appropriate for certain social problems. Statistical analysis
and the other tools of “abstracted empiricism” are often appropriate when dealing with
small homogenous populations, but when dealing with large, heterogeneous populations,
such methods can often cause more damage than good and represent the imposition of
power rather than an accurate understanding of a situation. According to Easterly and
Scott, this is particularly apparent in international development. Many of the early
development projects that began about the time Mills was writing failed because they
tended to assume an economic-rational human nature and took the nation as their unit of
analysis. This didn’t take into account the great variety of human motivations or the
diversity in and across different nations. While these early failures led to a fierce debate
that continues today, Easterly and Scott show these same bureaucratic abstracted
empiricism approaches continue to be the most commonly used methods.
While Easterly focuses on the practical problem of switching to a more effective
approach to international development, Scott and Mills both argue that overcoming the
Planner approach requires understanding and overcoming the ontological and
epistemological roots that serve as a foundation for the more bureaucratic Planner
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approaches. Scott and Mills are not alone. These assumptions have been strongly
challenged in the 20th century by philosophers like Nietzsche and Heidegger.
Alternative approaches to the study of international development, then, can
perhaps best begin with the examination of those 20th century philosophers that strongly
challenge the assumptions upon which most development work is based.
Heidegger and Nietzsche argue that modern science (and modernity more
broadly) has taken over from the Greeks the erroneous ontological assumption that there
is a true world, hidden by appearance, accessible to math and logic, that never changes—
a world of being. This view assumes that there is a true core to objects that humans often
cover up with various layers of meaning. A statue can be viewed as a religious object for
veneration or, scientifically, as a material formed by molecules and properties which was
then carved and imbued with an extraneous religious meaning. In what follows I attempt
to show how contemporary scholarship on international development has often been
structured on the assumption that the purpose of scholarship is to uncover the truth that
underlies this world. If it is accepted that there is a universal truth about how things are,
and if that truth can be discovered, it makes sense to develop both methods that will
uncover that truth and a division of labor that will work on different aspects of reality.
The academy becomes a giant mapmaking endeavor that seeks to model reality in
mathematical terms.
Mills calls this the “strange block building endeavor” (1959: 65). Individual
scholars “narrow the work to ‘minute’ investigations on the assumption that their findings
can be ‘put together’ [in a way that leads to an] ‘integrated social science’.” Mills argues
that many of the issues and social problems dealt with in sociology are simply too broad
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and too complicated to be studied in this manner. It seems inevitable that narrowing the
scope to such minutiae produces a bureaucratic sociology. Dealing with alternatives to
the status quo require comparative and historical approaches. It involves developing what
Mills calls “the sociological imagination” and what Scott calls “practical knowledge” or
“metis” (1998: 309). It is also the kind of approach Easterly is seeking for when he calls
for Searchers, the kind of approach that is sensitive to local conditions, flexible and not
based on a predefined Big Plan. It is an approach that makes scholars feel uncomfortable
precisely because it flies in the face of how the Western tradition has come to approach
knowledge.
This plea for social science to return to a comparative historical sociology that
functions as a public philosophy doesn’t mean that the now common abstracted empirical
methods have to be thrown out. Both Jurgen Habermas and Robert Bellah have used
them in combination with historical and comparative studies with an eye to encouraging
and expanding the public sphere. Bellah argues the social sciences are increasingly
turning into “evermore specialized…subdisciplines [that] often cannot speak to one
another, much less to the public” (1996: 299). Like Mills, he thinks that this leads to
“impoverishment of the public sphere” and must be counteracted with a return to the
comparative and historical approaches that are now found in the humanities.

The twentieth century is replete with examples of the Big Plan failing. The danger
of approaching social problems like a natural scientist would approach molecular
interactions can be seen in the many attempts at development in the third world in the last
100 years. The staggering numbers of the poor sacrificed on the altar of progress (Mao’s
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Great Leap Forward, which may have caused 20 million deaths, is the obvious example
of botched social planning) should cause us to yield and reconsider how we approach
social planning. How do you help a particular people solve social problems and leave
behind underdevelopment without crushing them in the process? The moral compulsion
driving this thesis is the continuing problematic nature of international development
projects.
In Chapter 1, I examine how this approach has shaped the development projects
of the 20th century. International development seeks to help countries that are “underdeveloped” improve. While there have been many successes, there also have been too
many failures. The failures have produced a debate seeking answers about how
international development should be done. These debates help to reveal the fundamental
assumptions about the nature of knowledge and being and have produced suggestions
about how such approaches need to be changed. Many of these suggestions center around
the need to avoid the kind of broad, universal application of models that are produced by
contemporary social science in favor of tentative models that are sensitive to local
meanings and structures. I rely heavily on the work of thinkers like Scott (1998) to
examine alternatives. Chapter 1 argues that the failures of international development are
not surprising if understood within the context of the project of modernity.
Chapter 2, therefore, turns to the project of modernity. I use Comte to point out, in
agreement with Neiman (2002), that the project of modernity seeks control. I examine
how thinkers in modernity assume the world is like a giant machine that can be
disassembled and reassembled though mathematics. I also use the discipline of history to
illustrate the academic division of labor that makes up the project of modernity. The
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division of labor has succeeded, however, less in producing a unified vision of reality
than multiplying methods and interpretations of reality. This discussion serves to show
both the ontological assumptions of modernity and the ironic situation that a system
aiming to discover the underlying truth has instead produced a cacophony of ways of
interpreting the world.
Chapter 3 uses Heidegger and Nietzsche to zero in on the ontological assumption
that there is a deep truth to be discovered by scholars. Both Heidegger and Nietzsche
challenge this assumption, and their work helped to inspire the postmodern rebellion.
Chapter 3 is the most abstract section and seeks to overturn what I think is the most
fundamental ontological assumption of modernity.
The task of chapter 4 is to examine the implications of this ontological
reevaluation for the social sciences. There are different responses to the challenge set
down by Nietzsche and Heidegger and I examine only a few. Ultimately, however, I am
in favor of the suggestions given by Scott, Easterly and others. The suggestions in chapter
4, then, are further support for these conclusions.
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CHAPTER 1: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Scholars working with issues related to international development in the 20th
century have seen many successes, but there have also been many failures. The failures in
Latin America and more recently in Russia especially have led to a productive debate
about how such projects should occur and reveal the need to rethink the fundamental
assumptions of international development.
I begin by reviewing the three different schools of thought within international
development: Modernization Theory, Dependency Theory and World Systems Analysis.
I then describe the growing opposition to how development projects are approached and
carried out. A pivotal work that sums up these criticisms is Scott’s Seeing Like a State:
How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1998). Scott argues
that many of the massive projects carried out in the 20th century display a lack of
sensitivity to local meanings and structures. By assuming the universality of certain
“scientific” conclusions without recognizing the differences of particular communities
these development projects were undermined. Scott argues for a new mentality
surrounding these efforts that he calls mētis. This section finishes with a discussion of
how these problems reflect the flaws of modernity.

International Development
Historically, international development must be understood in the context of the
Cold War (McMichael 2000). The project of modernization began when the US moved
quickly into Western Europe to reconstruct it after World War II. The Marshall Plan was
an effort to keep Europe out of the orbit of communist Russia. As the threat of
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communism spread to Asia, Latin America and Africa, the USA and now-reconstructed
Western Europe moved to pull these countries into the orbit of the market system.
Despite a clear concern for the spread of communism, Western motivations for
promoting development have been multiple and varied. State run development plans
should not imply that self interest or humanitarianism have not played a role in the
development of Europe and the rest of the world. After the initial political impetus, both
business organizations interested in expanding to new markets and more humanitarianminded organizations moved in to participate in modernization. When Western Europe
had been largely rebuilt, modernization turned to the rest of the world which was just
beginning to throw off colonial shackles. The motivations for such a move on the part of
the US and Western Europe are by no means straightforward. There may have been some
who were genuinely concerned for poorer nations, some who saw an advantage for US
businesses, and others who wanted to fight communism. Even today the motivations
behind the project of modernization run a long spectrum. These different motivations
shape opinions about how to best bring about modernization.
Even with the best of intentions, however, international development projects
have a record marred by some spectacular failures. The Tanganyika groundnut scheme in
what is now called Tanzania failed miserably at a cost of £49 million to the British
government (Myddelton, 2007). The green revolution caused a war in Punjab. The
attempt to settle most of Tanzania’s population (5 million were moved) into the ujamaa
villages from 1973 to 1976 failed (Scott, 1998). Such failures should cause both NGOs
and governments to pause and consider the financial pitfalls, and, more importantly, the
human costs of such schemes. Hans Jonas (1984: 30) argues that our sheer technological
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power, the fact that we can change human life, means that we need to develop a
“heuristic of fear” that approaches that power with humility and caution, instead of wild
utopian hope.
Many modernization projects did not (and do not) manifest a heuristic of fear. If
anything, what they manifest is a strong faith in science and the human ability to
comprehend reality. This kind of hubris is reminiscent of colonialists dividing up Africa
and Asia with little regard for local cultures. Indeed, Scott argues that what he calls “high
modernism” is the same pseudo-scientific ideology that has driven colonialism,
communism, fascism and contemporary development projects.
The pretensions of Corbusier, the demolition of Pruit Igoe, the disorienting
Brasília, the technocratic revolution of Lenin, the naïve invasions of Vietnam and Iraq,
the continual problems in the Middle East and Africa caused by colonialism—the
examples of scientific mismanagement in world affairs are legion. Why do such mistakes
and problems seem to reoccur in such varied circumstances? For the NGO seeking to
alleviate poverty, what can be done to avoid hurting the people the NGO seeks to help?
While some of these examples, like the American invasions of Vietnam and Iraq, seem
far removed from international development projects, there is a disturbing continuity
behind all these endeavors.
The potentially problematic aspects of international development can be seen in
the theory that informed many of the early modernization projects, namely modernization
theory—especially in comparison with the criticisms and counter theories that arose as a
result of early failures. Modernization theory placed all developing nations on a model of
growth based on the historical growth of industrialized nations like the United States and
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England. It was assumed that developing nations would move along a similar route.
These assumptions, however, often failed to take into account cultural and historical
differences. Trying to force developing nations into and through industrialization at such
a quick pace while at the same time ignoring cultural difference divided many
undeveloped countries and left them deeply in debt.

Modernization Theory: The Big Plan
The first major theory behind the project of modernization was simply called
modernization theory. This theory was influenced by functionalism and the evolutionary
approaches of Comte, Spencer, Tonnies and Durkheim (So 1990). Pulling from these
traditions, modernization theory argued there was a sequence of steps the US and
Western Europe had gone through to reach their current point. For modernization theory
the task was to find out what these steps were and how to help other countries move
along this trajectory faster. According to So (1990), modernization theory borrowed six
assumptions from European evolutionary theory and three from functionalism. The
process of Westernization, then, was said to be:
1.

Phased - various steps can be distinguished and applied to different
situations.

2.

homogenizing – as we saw with the example of internal colonization
above, standardization makes societies legible

3.

Europeanization (or Americanization) – as with Hegel ‘s Prussia,
modernization would make other countries like the US and Europe

4.

irreversible – modern societies cannot reverse the process
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5.

progressive – modernity is better than pre-modernity

6.

lengthy – change is not Marxist revolution, but gradual shifts

And from functionalism:
1.

systematic – the parts of modernity come together like a machine

2.

transformative – the norms and values of pre-modern societies are
changed completely as they enter modernity

3.

immanent – changes in one part of the modern machine affect other parts
which adjust as needed to keep the machine functioning

Modernization theorists struggled to understand how to best help poorer nations
modernize. If the process was not revolutionary but evolutionary, what could be done to
help ensure that the process did occur (or began if it hadn’t already)? Rostow argued
there were five steps in modernization and that the pivotal middle stage is the “take off”
stage (So, 1990: 29). If infrastructure is built up and enough resources and capital
mobilized, a developing country can begin to grow economically faster than the needs of
its own population and develop the kind of surplus that would allow it to enter the
international market system. With the economy expanding at a rate faster than the
immediate needs of the population, the country will “take off.” The job of developed
nations, then, is to provide the stimulus needed to get developing countries to take off and
become self-sufficient.
The developed nations hurried into action. But things did not always proceed as
planned. Latin America especially saw hopeful projects fail. Modernization theory now
had to explain why various projects hadn’t worked. Baran (1978) offered the explanation
that developing countries could see the changes taking place in advanced countries. This
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aroused hopes and envy, but impatience with the slow process (and the availability of
communist alternatives) threatened revolution. The middle class, afraid of losing gains
had already made, joined with the landed aristocracy to defend itself instead of rebelling
against them as occurred in France, England and America. The lack of infrastructure
discouraged those with capital from investing it in their own country and they settled for
short term gains that did not improve conditions in their own country. The government
did not have the capital, the competence, or the support of the wealthy to even approach
the massive changes implied in the process of modernization.
Thus, the impediment to economic growth and social change in developing
countries is an alliance between “feudal landlords, industrial royalists and the capitalist
middle class” (Baran 1978: 108). This alliance, combined with nationalism and
xenophobia, has produced a conservativism that preserves developing countries in a state
of backwardness. Modernization theorists nonetheless insisted that nations like America,
England, and France, which broke through their own defunct institutions, had to aid other
countries that were struggling through these changes.

Dependency Theory
The mixed success of modernization in Latin America spawned a backlash in the
late1950s and 1960s. Disgruntled intellectuals began to see hypocrisy on the part of
richer nations and sought to rethink what modernization was really doing. Drawing upon
Marx, they began forming an antithetical theory to modernization called dependency
theory.
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With dependency theory, the Marxist critique splits in two. Marx sees imperialism
as (1) a source of misery, (2) the precondition for massive advance, and (3) something
that must be overcome to obtain that advance (Brewer 1990: 55). Imperialism is a painful
but necessary process. Countries stuck in the Asiatic mode of production (meaning they
are not moving along Marx’s teleological trajectory and are, hence, atemporal) need a
little push. If colonialism is inevitable for a better future, then so be it.
But neo-Marxism rejects the Hegelian inevitability of colonialism. As a result,
Marxist theories concerning the development of capitalism are divided into traditional
Marxists who describe capitalism as a progressive and ultimately inevitable process
leading toward socialism and neo-Marxists who see capitalism as a lecherous system
where core states “progress” at the expense of peripheries, which are underdeveloped in
the process (Brewer 1990). The first view recognizes the abuses of capitalism and seeks
to push forward towards a more just socialist society, but insists capitalism is a stage in
the process. The later view thinks more in terms of a zero sum game, where one going up
means another going down.
Dependency theorists are neo-Marxists. They don’t share the evolutionary
perspective of modernization theory or traditional Marxism (So 1990). The relationship
between periphery states and the core states is seen as a parasitic one. Thus for
dependency theory, modernizing states are best served by keeping the core states out.
A representative argument is that of Andre Gunter Frank. Frank (1978: 114)
argues “underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions,” but rather
that the development of capitalism itself produces underdevelopment. Previous
modernization theorists have favored the perspectives of the metropoles (the richer
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nations and cities) and insufficiently addressed the history of the satellites (the periphery
nations and rural areas). Policy decisions aiming to bring market relations to “feudal”
satellites actually exacerbate conditions of underdevelopment. The metropoles are
sucking the satellites dry, victims of the workings of the market.
This can be seen historically: when metropoles suffered through economic
downswings, satellite areas begin to develop. When metropoles rebound, satellite areas
again are pushed into servile relations with the metropole. Furthermore, satellite areas
that served as major exporters of primary products for metropoles (such as India with
England), still remain underdeveloped.

Note that the neo-Marxist dependency theorists challenge the assumptions of
modernization theory, which are quite similar to those of traditional Marxism. From the
list of assumptions of modernization theory neo-Marxist dependency theory challenges
all those that are implicit in Hegelian, Marxist and similar evolutionary theories. For neoMarxist dependency theory progress is not inevitable, progressive, phased, homogenizing
or systematic. For these thinkers the failure of developing countries to progress according
to the plan was not a reflection of failure on the part of these countries, but rather failure
on the part of the plan that had been outlined by Modernization theory. Development
theorists pointed to a pattern in failures of development projects that can be found
throughout similar efforts over the twentieth century and argued that the process of
categorization and systemization perceived as modeling reality was deeply flawed. The
models created by social scientists include assumptions that often reflect much more on
the social scientists than the societies they would change. Much that is socially
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constructed was taken by the Hegelian tradition as universal. A good example of this is
the common tendency of social scientists to use nations as units of analysis and to limit
themselves to the methods and intellectual history of their own discipline. A second
critical response to modernization theory hinges on precisely this criticism.

World Systems Analysis and Globalization
Globalization was anticipated by world systems analysis. World systems analysis
grew out of dependency theory but argued that the limited scope of both modernization
theory and dependency theory could not offer an accurate picture of what is occurring on
a worldwide level. Instead, following the French Annales school, world systems analysis
takes a world system as its unit of analysis, thus moving the focus even higher (So 1990).
Wallerstein (1978) argues that underdevelopment cannot be understood without
recognizing it as a process occurring in the peripheral areas of a larger capitalist world
economy. For Wallerstein, attempting to understand underdevelopment in isolation,
without reference to a historical, world-level context, results in distortions.
To illustrate, for Wallerstein underdevelopment arose in the 17th century power
shift from the Dutch to the English and French during an economic downturn. England
and France benefited from colonization while peripheral and semi-peripheral states (like
Italy and Spain) suffered. Followers of Wallerstein have insisted that even going back to
the rise of modernity in the 16th and 17th centuries is not enough. Abu-Lughod pushes her
study back prior to the rise of Europe and focuses largely on non-European countries
(1989). This broader perspective is a direct challenge to the assumptions underlying
modernization theory. Like development theory, world systems analysis argues that
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modernization theory involves too many simplifications that become more reductive than
explanatory. By expanding the scope of study, the nation begins to appear a rather
capricious unit of analysis.
The pervasive use of nations as units of analysis is largely a result of the
conditions from which development projects started. McMichaels (2000) argues that the
various development projects have been conceived and implemented under a conceptual
framework inherited from the Cold War. The central unit under this framework was the
nation and the task of development has been to incorporate nations into the capitalistic
system which is led by the model nation, the USA. However, like Wallerstein and AbuLughod, McMichaels argues this has underestimated the global nature of economic
activity and repeatedly produced a situation in which poorer nations are blamed for
economic failures that are produced by the larger global economy. In this way, richer
nations can and have conveniently abdicated responsibility.
McMichaels maintains that the first economic failures were caused by attempting
to have each nation function as an independent economic unit that could compete with
other (already developed) nations. This perspective doesn’t take into account the lengthy
process that goes into making a nation. For instance, the nation of “France” has not
always existed. It was constructed through a homogenizing process that took centuries.
Many different languages and dialects had to be pushed aside in favor of the Parisian
dialect which became “French.” Customs and culture had to be homogenized. That is,
France had to be “made.” Modernization theorists made the mistake of taking developing
nations to be the kind of homogenized nations France, England and the United Stated
have become. Countries like China and Bolivia have many different languages, different
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beliefs, different races and different fundamental attitudes towards life. Developing
nations are not nations of homogeneous, rationally self-interested peoples. It may be
impossible for leaders in such countries to get everyone on the same page in terms of
national goals and development projects—and even if it were possible, the patchwork
peoples might not want to. Not surprisingly, trying to treat China as if its people will
respond in the same way Americans do completely overlooks the nuances of what it
means to be a nation and what it means to be human.
When the attempt to get developing nations to function as independent economic
units on par with the developed nations failed to work, it was suggested each nation
should specialize and then enter the global market (as the NICs had done successfully).
This attempt also underestimated the complexity of what was involved for
underdeveloped nations. Constant throughout these efforts are Western assumptions that
are not shared universally and a nation-centric view that has missed global trends.

Problematic Theoretical Assumptions in International Development
Both dependency theory and world systems analysis represent attempts to rethink
the problematic fundamental assumptions of modernization theory. The proponent of
both approaches argued that Modernization theory made a whole series of assumptions
about human nature and the nature of a nation that contributed to the failure of many
development projects. However, the assumptions of modernization theory are ultimately
founded on deeper assumptions about the nature of knowledge (epistemology) and the
nature of being (ontology). Seeing how this is so is critical. These deeper assumptions
often go unexamined. Examination of fundamental assumptions reveals that the system of
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thought that under girds modern social science approaches is representative of what is
often called modernity by theorists attempting to think through these assumptions. With
this in mind then, modernization theory, then, can be seen as a specific approach used in
international development that reflects the assumptions of a larger project: the project of
modernity. Despite the pervasiveness and power of this larger project of modernity, it is
not without its fundamental flaws. In what follows I attempt to show how the failure of
many of these early development projects reveals key problems in the project of
modernity and the often unexamined epistemological and ontological assumptions that
support it.
The typical model of an institution or organization is to approach problems with
an eye to dissecting them, examining the parts and discovering the internal logic. With
the problem thus grasped the organization or knowledgeable actor can pull strings and
tweak where needed to produce different results.
Postma (1998) argues that modernist approaches to social problems and
institutions assume that reality is like a machine. The job of the scientist is discover how
the various parts interconnect and work together. For modernists, understanding the
issues involved in development projects is a matter of assembling or reordering the
proper parts, putting them in the right place and driving away. These epistemological
assumption are examined in Chapter 2.
There is a growing acknowledgement that the mechanistic approach is inaccurate
and insufficient. Postma argues development issues cannot be approached as one would
approach fix a car. Development may not be a smooth running machine, but a river. A
river starts small and follows the lay of the land. It gives and it takes. It is never the same.
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He highlights one of the key ontological assumptions that inform development
approaches: Modernity assumes there is an unchanging core behind appearance that must
be accessed. The scientific method aims to strip away false ideas and get behind mere
appearances to what actually is. These ontological assumptions are examined in Chapter
3.
The increasingly complicated world of globalization has made it clear that the
simple, universal explanations desired by modernity are not possible. Hirshman (1995:
76) argues against “searching for universal solutions to development problems” and
defining the “one best way.” Theories tend to ossify, but since the social world is
“tangled and ambiguous” what may approach being a universal law in some situation
may not work at all in a different “subsection of human society” (91). Hirshman argues
for a move “from ideological certainty to more open-ended, eclectic, skeptical inquiry”
(183). Self-Subversion prevents the reification (deification?) of theories that will
inevitably need tweaking.
The lack of self criticism by modernist social sciences comes about because “they
invest much self esteem and even identity” in their work. Instead of being flexible, they
move forward like Kuhnian normal science, seeking to confirm existing paradigms (90).
But, Hirshman warns, a wishy washy world just might require a wishy washy pluralism
(198).
Likewise, Wallerstein (1988) adds to the criticism of the limitations of modernity
by rejecting its tendency towards math-like concepts that are universal and arguing
instead that social reality is in process. Not recognizing the ever-shifting nature of the
social world or making over-simple generalizations are errors. Central concepts of world-
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systems analysis like core and periphery, are mixed up in the social world, core states
often acting in ways like periphery states. Instead of taking central concepts for granted
as fixed entities, it is essential to understand the process of their creation.
Wallerstein takes nouns like proletariat and peripheral and shows how tracing
their history results in their being verbed to produce peripheralization and
proletarianization. The stress on process implies the necessity of macro-level analysis. If
one accepts the importance of process one can no longer fall back on non-contextual
conceptual building blocks.

Application Issues
Such arguments are not empty intellectual debates. Scott argues the disruption of
the moral economy of the peasant due to the colonial imposition of North American
capitalism and the modern state led to the major peasant revolutions of the 20th century
and events like the Vietnam War (Scott 1976). Colonial powers (and development
theorists) treated peasants like the rational actors of bourgeoisie capitalism and expected
them to take risks like entrepreneurs, but this ignored the rationality of subsistence
peasants who lived so close to the edge. Peasant subsistence logic aims at minimizing
risk and assuring relative security, not maximizing profits.
Scott criticizes theorists who define exploitation as an “abstract normative
standard” without reference to “the values of real actors” (160). This lack of empirical,
phenomenological sensitivity results in the ignorant “easy formulas” that seem to be
repeatedly played out in international events (176). This leads to social disruption,
increased poverty in peripheral areas, and possibly rebellion and war.
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Like Hirshman, Wallerstein, and Abu-Lughod, Scott considers the traditional
approaches are dangerously reductive, but Scott is particularly helpful because he shows
how the naïve assumptions of traditional approaches turn out in specific cases, what those
effects are, and what needs to be done to avoid such errors. It is therefore useful to
examine in more detail what Scott has to say.
His argument is most fully summed up in Seeing Like a State: How Certain
Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (1998). This definitive statement
with regard to international development marks a move away from just saying what the
problems with development are to the intellectual mindset behind them. It is important to
recognize that although development projects fall within the purview of Scott’s argument,
he also includes the scientifically managed projects that are not limited to development,
but are also present in communist and other efforts to socially engineer particular
peoples.
Scott begins with an example that shows quite clearly the problems of modernist
development theory and practice: German scientific forestry. The application of science
to forestry aimed at transforming the “chaotic old-growth forests into a new, more
uniform forest that closely resembled [an] administrative grid” (1998: 15). In order to
maximize profit from logging, forests were cleared and only certain species of trees were
planted in a systematic fashion. In Scott’s terms the forest is thus made “legible” (1998:
21), comprehensible to the scientific mind and thus capable of being managed. Not
surprisingly, the scientifically managed forests ruined peasant lands and destroyed the
ecosystem, which was torn apart and then reordered in ways that reflected little
understanding of the interconnection of all the elements of the forest. Vines, a nuisance to
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the economically minded scientists, are needed to kill older trees and make room for new
growth. The annoying insects of the forest were needed to pollinate the trees, but then
larger animals were needed to keep down the insect populations. Eventually scientists
began the ironic process of artificially reintroducing elements of the old, chaotic order
like beehives and anthills. For Scott, scientific forestry illustrates the “dangers of
dismembering an exceptionally complex and poorly understood set of relations and
processes in order to isolate a single element of instrumental value” (1998: 21).
It is not a stretch to see that the same kind of logic underlies social engineering
and development projects. Scott argues this kind of approach is not only dangerous, it has
the wrong idea of what and how both the natural and social worlds are:
“If the natural world, however shaped by human use, is too unwieldy in its
‘raw’ form for administrative manipulation, so too are the actual social patterns of
human interaction with nature bureaucratically indigestible in their raw form. No
administrative system is capable of representing any existing social community
except through a heroic and greatly schematized process of abstraction and
simplification.” (1998: 22)
Here Scott rejects the assumption of modernity that the social world can be made
fully transparent to the social scientist. There are too many variables that interact in too
intricate a manner to extricate them all such that one can grasp exactly what is going on.
All the “diversity and intricacy…could not be assimilated into an administrative grid
without being either transformed or reduced to a convenient, if partly functional,
shorthand” (1998:24). Modernity for Scott is the attempt to make reality legible.
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Scott illustrates this point through the internal colonization of France mentioned
above. To make the French nation, the French government saw the need to standardize
the language, measurements and land tenure customs of wildly diverse groups of people.
Previous to these internal colonization projects each village had its own traditions, its
own dialects, and its own measurements. Peasants worked on tracts of land that were
often long strips. Simply put, such diversity was hard to tax and hard to control. One
hundred years later we find Russia engaged in the same sort of inner colonization,
rationalizing and reorganizing entire villages during the Stolyin Reform (1998: 40).
This process of making the world “legible” is just the first step in setting up
modernist projects. Once a society has been made legible, it is in a position to be
manipulated. When combined with the right ideology, a strong government or a similar
powerful organization and an acquiescent civil society, the table is set for the grand social
engineering projects of modernity. “The legibility of a society provides the capacity for
large scale social engineering, high-modernist ideology provides the desire, the
authoritarian state provides the determination to act on that desire, and an incapacitated
civil society provides the level social terrain on which to build” (1998:5).
With this pattern in mind, Scott examines the city planning efforts of Corbusier,
the scientifically planned Brasília, Lenin’s elitist revolution, Soviet collectivization,
villagization in Tanzania and Ethiopia, and agronomic science. Each of these examples
illustrates his point that such hubristic projects are doomed to fail for not paying full
attention to the local social reality of each situation.
As a culminating example, Scott criticizes modernist agronomic science. He
offers four reasons for the systematic failures of agronomic science:
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1.

The discipline originated in “the temperate, industrial West” and thus
“inherited a series of unexamined assumptions about cropping and field
preparation that turned out to work badly in other contexts” (1998:264).

2.

The projects initiated by agronomic science in other parts of the world
“were continually bent to serve the power and status of officials and the
state organization they controlled.” They were insensitive to the needs
of locals (1998:264).

3.

The projects’ productionist goals didn’t take into account factors that
didn’t seem relevant to the short term purpose of making money. “The
systematic, cyclopean shortsightedness of high modernist agriculture
courted failure” for lacking to take into account water quality, the
relation between farmers, etc (1998:264).

4.

The projects ignored local traditions that had been used for years and
which did take into account the many variables involved. The locals
were assumed to be incompetent and their working methods were
replaced by scientific ones.

Scott cautions that he does not want to throw agronomic science out, rather he is
concerned with the “imperial pretensions” that underpin its inability to be flexible and
comprehend with the local understanding that results from years of working in a specific
location (1998:264). Why not see the local farmers as scientific experts themselves, as
they have spent hundreds of years experimenting on the land they now farm, teasing out
the best methods possible (1998:286)?

27

The problem, for Scott, is not science itself, but unscientific and modernist
aspects of scientific practice. He singles out the aesthetic and institutional aspects of high
modernist science (1998: 290). It is particularly obvious in the case of city planning that
aesthetics, the ideal of an orderly, systematic city got in the way of the living, breathing
city that results from more spontaneous growth (1998: 261). The scientifically managed
forest looks nice, with orderly rows of trees, but it doesn’t work. Brasília looks great on a
blueprint or from an airplane window, but the citizens who moved there found it
unlivable. This tendency to favor the orderly, systematic, legible map over the lived
reality is one of central points of the argument against modernist theory and practice and
will appear in various ways throughout this thesis.
The “institutional and perhaps commercial pressures” lead to a strict adherence to
method in modernist approaches (1998: 294). It produces results that seem nice and
orderly, but that are often gross reductions of what is actually going on. And it is not a
matter of simply refining the methods either: when the natural world is tied closely to the
social world—and with social reality more generally—there are “too many variables [in]
simultaneous play to offer much chance of unambiguous experimental proof of causal
relations” (1998: 290).

The Ethical Imperative
It is one thing to do a poor job fixing a car. When human life is thrown into the
mix, ethics become a major concern. A large part of the call for change in the mentality
and methodology of development projects is driven by ethical concerns.
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As Stiglitz (2003) shows in his Nobel prize winning book Globalization and its
Discontents, narrow-minded modernist thinking still plays an all-too prominent role in
contemporary institutions. Stiglitz argues IMF bungling in developing countries is a
result of dogmatic market fundamentalism and perpetuates colonialism (41). The IMF,
ideologically enamored of the power of the market, has repeatedly implemented policies
which ignore the “limitations of the market” and “the social and political context in
which all economies must function” in a manner that would make Adam Smith blush
(219). For the IMF, faith in the inevitable long term progress justifies short term pains—
even to the point that continuing pain is taken as continuing progress (19)!
Stiglitz states that globalization has the potential to do a lot of good, but the
policies that aim at guiding the world through the process are exacerbating wounds and
need to be radically rethought (ix). The IMF needs to focus on the needs of all, and not
just those of creditors (210). Even if the trickle down effect does work sometimes, it
certainly will not when moral responsibility is ignored and the IMF acts as a policing
agency for the wealthy.
Kaplan (2000) describes the modernist model as isolating, starving and torturing a
prisoner. What if, he asks, instead of attempting to beat the prisoner into submission and
producing silence and resentment, we instead let him go free? Perhaps if we didn’t push
him for the answers we want and instead let him be, he might come around. Might not the
knowledge we obtain from a friend who feels more comfortable with us be different from
what we might glean from clenched, bloodied lips?
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Kaplan argues a radically new form of practice and thinking is needed. This
paradigm shift involves two aspects: (1) changing from the tangible to the intangible; and
(2) from static model to development reading.
(1) Development programs aim at making as much information as possible
measurable and quantified. This allows the information to be easily grasped and give
indications of what might be done. But, like Scott, Kaplan argues many aspects of real
world problems are simply not tangible. Often mistakes are made because the numbers
are trusted and the intangible ignored. Kaplan argues scientists are taught to think only in
terms of the tangible, and cannot handle what cannot be easily calculated. However, if
they cannot develop an ability to move around in the intangible world, they risk IMF–
style massive mismanagement. Notice that for Westerners the reaction to the task of
learning to navigate the intangible is nearly incomprehensible. To know is to make
tangible. Kaplan is pointing to a radical change in thinking that challenges the most
fundamental assumptions of our way of thinking.
(2) Knowledge (or organizations in Kaplan’s case) is seen as being made up of
interconnecting elements. These elements vary from tangible to intangible. The pieces are
considered to be static. They don’t change. But Kaplan points out how this is an
assumption that seems to be proved false time and time again in practice. Real life is
more complicated than any amount of variables we can assemble. To avoid beating the
prisoner to make it fit (which often produces distorted results) requires an ability to
“read” the situation. This means that there is a flexible ability to handle the natural
shiftiness of the real life situation. Inflexible imposition on a situation often mangles the
thing that is intended to be understood. Again, scientists end up with a situation like the
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IMF, imposing the same solutions across every variation and making things worse in the
process.
Mistakes in development projects, especially when they are on the global level of
IMF, have huge ramifications. Decisions on top affect millions on the bottom. When
decisions do negatively affect those on the bottom, sometimes causing more damage than
anything else, such mistakes require careful scrutiny. While the project of modernization
has had many successes, one of the results of the failures is the attempt to rethink the
fundamental paradigm, including the assumptions and methods involved. As seen with
Kaplan, it may be that radical changes are needed. Scientists can perhaps force change as
they have in the past, but should they not seek methods that don’t just beat what they
want into place? If we don’t stop and ask the important questions, how will we ever know
if the suffering required by development projects are necessary “growing pains” or if the
suffering is due to trying to force square pegs through round holes? The ethical
imperative of development projects seems to require that we develop the sensitivity
needed to read situations without modernist pretensions and by doing so be capable to
responding appropriately.

For the NGO or government that wants to help some particular cause, how can the
pitfalls of previous failures be avoided? In the course of examining the history of the
theories that have driven the projects of modernity and the counter theories that have
attempted to address its inadequacies we find in both Scott and Kaplan a deep sense that
the imperial pretension of modernist ideology is the central problem. Such pretension
comes from a deep faith in the ability of science to capture through abstraction the
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essential features of a particular phenomenon or society. But, as we shall see in chapters
3 and 4 abstract systems are parasitic on informal practices. They take a reduction as fact.
None of this means that science needs to be thrown out, but, rather, that we need
to recognize and explore its limits. In chapter 2 we begin to examine the utopian
pretension that drives modernity and the epistemological and ontological assumptions it
entails. In the final chapter we will delve more fully into what an alternative might look
like.
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CHAPTER 2: MODERNITY
The ethical imperative to do a better job with development projects encourages a
reexamination of the fundamental assumptions underlying modernity. The successes of
modernity have produced an understandable faith in science. Science brings control over
the world. But with such power comes danger. Besides the ethical concerns surrounding
nuclear power, environmental degradation, and so forth, a far from spotless record in
development projects has led to a discussion of the fundamental assumptions of
modernity. This chapter will examine the rise of modernity and detail some of its
assumptions.
As Postma (1998) hinted in Chapter 1, the project of modernity views the world
as a kind of machine accessible to human knowledge and control through math. Such a
mechanical view produces a massive academic division of labor aimed at mapping out
reality. This may work for the natural sciences, but is problematic for a social scientific
approach to understanding and solving development problems. The discipline of history
is particularly revealing for how modernity can contribute to its own failure. Historians
sought to achieve a universal, positivistic account of history and failed. This failure
illustrates how a modernist division of labor in academia works and the problems it faces
outside the natural sciences. Such failures are ultimately dependent on ontological
assumptions concerning the nature of the being of the things studied by scientists. Instead
of producing a unified map of reality that such ontological assumptions point to, the
attempt to map reality produces a cacophony of maps and methods. The irony of
modernity is that the central aim to produce one united comprehensive vision of the
world results in multiple, diverse interpretations of the world.
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Modernity
According to Bauman (1991), modernity is a desire for order and a corresponding
fear of ambiguity. This definition has something in common with the harsh point of
Horkheimer and Adorno in The Dialectics of Enlightenment (2002) where they argue that
modern thought, with scientists primarily at the helm, is an extension of the premodern
mythical quest for control over the world. The sorcerer who casts spells and the scientist
who does experiments both have the same goal: the fear of the unknown and the
ambiguous drives their attempts to control and order life.
While the premodern also sought after order, it was in the business of preserving
order. Bauman (1987) describes the premodern as a gamekeeper model. The job of those
in charge is to keep the status quo. Modernity, however, does not aim to preserve order,
but wants more control. Bauman describes the modern as a gardener model. The aim is to
make order, as a gardener makes a garden. First, order must be planned. Then, what is in
the place of the future garden must be dug up to make way (modernization theory, as we
saw above, aimed at eliminating previous cultural norms with those more conducive to
the market and growth). The garden is then planted and a process of careful monitoring
occurs over a long period of time. During this monitoring anything not a part of the plan,
like weeds or bugs, are eliminated.

The Project of Modernity
At times, some critics of modernity, such as Horkheimer and Adorno might lead
one to think that modernity is simply about a quest for power. While power is certainly
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involved, the founders of the project of modernity certainly didn’t consider the kind of
power they sought o be malevolent. Susan Neiman has shown how the desire to
overcome evil served as the major impetus to the thinkers who initiated the project of
modernity. At root, she argues, the motivation for modernist social and philosophical
thought is “this ought not to have happened” (2002: 5). She examines the major figures
that contributed to the project of modernity and concludes that their many differences
revolve around whether they agree or not with the fundamental principle that “the is and
the ought should coincide,” and how to bring about the justice this principle seeks (2002:
322). In other words, they wanted to improve the condition of humanity. Thus while
modernity may be fundamentally flawed, this does not imply malevolent intentions.
If we are tracing the historical origins of assumptions we find Comte was the
father of positivist sociology and Rousseau the father of the social sciences more broadly.
Going further back, Descartes articulated the methods and basic framework of the project
of modernity. In a nutshell, the project of modernity as we think of it now begins with
Descartes’ plan to find an indubitable foundation for knowledge. Leibniz thought such
knowledge would vindicate God. Humans would discover the set of laws that governed
the universe and would discover that based on those laws this really was the best of all
possible worlds. Neiman points out that this was a pivotal step because it places the laws
of the universe higher than God (2002:27). It also put humans in a position to understand
the world as God would.
The next step occurred when Rousseau acknowledged the role of history and
denied original sin. It was not God that made humankind in their fallen state, but the
contingencies of history. Humankind made this world a miserable place and it would be
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the responsibility of humanity to fix itself. The Enlightenment, then, had the lofty task of
sorting out the flaws of humanity, educating it, and guiding into a better future (2002:
44). This was the plan and project of Enlightenment that Comte hoped would bring about
the perfect society. There are many who think it has failed.
Many of the fundamental assumptions of the project of modernity, then, come
from Descartes. Indeed, he has become the scapegoat and whipping boy for those
opposed to the project of modernity. To understand why this is so requires understanding
some of the assumptions made by Descartes, which in turn requires a discussion of
clocks.

Machines as a Model for Society
Otto Mayr, in Authority, Liberty and Automatic Machinery in Early Modern
Europe, argues convincingly of the importance of machinery for early modern thinkers,
especially clocks. The early moderns had replaced sundials and waterclocks with
mechanical clocks. They didn’t stop at building clocks but built life-sized moving figures,
fountains, giant clocks, mechanical animals, music boxes, etc. Just as we are fascinated
with dazzling, new technology and often develop theories that are sometimes modeled on
them, so too the early moderns were fascinated with the mechanical technology of their
age and many of the theories that come out of the age were based on the assumption that
things function mechanically. The overarching metaphor of the period is, of course, the
clockwork universe.
Mayr argues “a central characteristic of the Scientific Revolution was the
commitment of its participants to thinking ‘mechanically’” (1989: 54). The clockwork
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universe is a conglomeration of various parts that fit together like cogs in a machine. The
laws of the universe are the pieces that somehow fit together to produce the working
whole. The job of the thinker is to figure out these laws. It is no surprise then that
Descartes believes causal relationships “were openly visible, unambiguous and
expressible in mathematical language” just like the “wheels, springs and weights of
machinery” (1989: 62). Je pense, donc je suis means, I am reason. And reason is
mechanical.
Not only the self becomes mechanical but also the state (1989: 102) and order
conceived more broadly (1989: 115). The self regulating market of Adam Smith is just
another self-regulating machine (1989: 169). La Mettrie agrees with Descartes but is
more explicit in Man a Machine. “The human body is a machine that winds its own
springs. It is the living image of perpetual movement. Nourishment keeps us the
movement which fever excites” (quoted in Steinberg, 2005: 55).
The foundation of the project of modernity, initiated by Descartes and other early
modernist thinkers, sought this secure foundation because the massive metaphysical
systems of the time were failing miserably. Husserl points out the clockwork universe
metaphor takes hold when “the contrast become monstrous between the repeated failures
of metaphysics and the uninterrupted and ever increasing wave of theoretical and
practical success in the positive sciences” (1970: 11). This important shift is nothing less
than the mathematization of knowledge.
In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy, Husserl pays
close attention to this mathematization of knowledge because he thinks it has led to the
crisis of his time:
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The exclusiveness with which the total world view of modern man in the
second half of the nineteenth century, let itself be determined by the
positive sciences and be blinded by the ‘prosperity’ they produced, meant an
indifferent turning away from the questions which are decisive for a genuine
humanity. Mere fact minded science makes merely fact minded people…In
our vital need—so we are told—this science has nothing to say to us. It
excludes in principle precisely the questions which…[are]…the most
burning: questions of the meaning or the meaninglessness of the whole of
this human existence…What does science have to say about reason and
unreason or about men as subjects of this freedom? (1970: 6)

Only mathematical, scientific knowledge is accepted as valid, but humans have to
deal with values. Values, the very thing humans need, are excluded as legitimate
knowledge and reduced to arbitrary opinions. What aimed to help humanity has created
unparalleled power but has abandoned the issues most central to human experience.
Husserl argues the mathematization of knowledge which comes from both Descartes and
Galileo aimed at omnipotence. The world vision they created is one in which:

The world is itself a rational systematic unity…in which each and every
singular detail must be rationally determined. Its systematic form...can be
attained, is indeed known and ready for us in advance, at least insofar as it
is purely mathematical…This is the path—infinite, to be sure—to
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omniscience. Thus one lives in the happy certainty of a path leading forth
from the near to the distant, from the more or less known into the
unknown, as an infallible method of broaching knowledge, through which
truly all of the totality of what is will be known as it is ‘in-itself’—in an
infinite progression (1970: 65).

Along with his growing, more and more perfect cognitive power over the
universe, man also gains an ever more perfect mastery over his practical
surrounding world, one which expands in an unending progression. This
also involves a master over mankind as belonging to the real surrounding
world, i.e. mastery over himself and his fellow man, an ever greater power
over his fate, and thus an ever fuller ‘happiness’—‘happiness’ as
rationally conceivable for man…Man is truly an image of God…For the
philosopher, in correlation with his mathematization of the world and of
philosophy, has in a certain sense mathematically idealized himself and, at
the same time, God (1970: 66).

According to Husserl, this pretension to be God is why Hume attacked
mathematics (1970: 67). This faith in math is why Descartes never investigated the ego
(1970: 82). What Descartes forgets is what Husserl calls the lifeworld, the direct
connection with the world (1970: 121). I will not attempt to discuss the lifeworld here.
That will be the task of the third chapter of this thesis. It is enough to briefly mention that
Husserl thinks, with Heidegger, that if the omnipresent desire to mathematize knowledge
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is overcome and the lifeworld reexamined without mathematizing it, we discover that
there are values (1970: 182). But this story will have to wait.
What has this excursion into Husserl shown us? It gives a better idea of what is
entailed in the mechanical and mathematical form of knowledge that has become the
standard of knowledge. On this model, knowledge is unambiguous (Descartes’ clear and
distinct ideas) and combinable into a coherent whole. The knower can gain a
comprehension of this whole, but even with knowledge of discrete parts of the whole the
knower still gains power. Bacon and Hobbes recognized this. Ultimately, if the pieces
were put together humanity would become gods.
The mathematization of knowledge did not only reflect a prejudice concerning the
existence and nature of truth. The clarity and precision of mathematics clearly has an
aesthetic element. Scott singles out a passage from Descartes concerning the difference
between scientific, mathematically designed cities and the chaotic traditional cities that
makes this clear:
These ancient cities that were once mere straggling villages and have
become in the course of time great cities are quite commonly poorly laid
out compared to those well-ordered towns that an engineer lays out on a
vacant plane as it suits his fancy. And although, upon considering one-byone the buildings in the former class of towns, one finds as much art or
more than one finds in the latter class of towns, still, upon seeing how the
buildings are arraigned—here a large one, there a small one—and how
they make the streets crooked and uneven, one will say that it is chance
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more than the will of some men using their reason that has made them
thus. (Scott, 1998: 55)

As the process of knowledge acquisition progressed, it became divided into
separate areas of focus that corresponded to different aspects of reality: physics, biology,
chemistry, economics, sociology, psychology, mathematics, etc. Thus, the project of
modernity became like a puzzle, each discipline concentrating on a part until the finished
pieces are put together to form the completed puzzle or map. With the final blueprint in
place, humanity will be able to construct utopia.
To understand how the overarching project of modernity shapes individual
discipline, I will examine the discipline of history. The debates in the philosophy of
history I examine make quite clear the problems of the mathematization of knowledge.
What is lost by insisting on systematic explanations is clearer in history than in other
disciplines. It is still clearer in disciplines like comparative literature, which explains why
the demands of the project of modernity were quickly abandoned when an alternative
came around. In history we find both an attempt to submit to the project of modernity and
intense debate about whether it is even possible.

19th Century Historiography and the Pretensions of Science
In a story entitled On Exactitude in the Sciences, Borges (1999) tells of a
cartography guild obsessed with producing the perfect map. A map of a city which is the
size of an entire city block is deemed insufficient, and a map that has a 1 to 1 ratio with
the city is produced, covering the land. The map is later deemed useless and left to rot.
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It seems that every discipline begins with a positivist. Only with a positivist will
the project of modernity lend something legitimacy. History begins as a distinct
discipline with the positivist Ranke, who functions with something like the mapmaking
model of knowledge. According to Ranke, History is only interested in “what actually
happened” and the “strict presentation of facts” (qtd. in Stern, 1973:57). The discipline of
history rises above the particulars to a “universal view of events” (Stern,1973:59). Like
the project of modernity more generally, the finished universal map of history is, in
practice, formed like a puzzle. Scholars working on “minutiae” take the pieces they
discover and they are “related to a larger context” until the “fullness and totality” of the
“universal history” is produced (Stern, 1973:61).
Later positivist historians like Bury and Elton fought to preserve this model of
history. “Each published piece of research represented a brick and the work of the
historian was therefore analogous to that of a skilled craftsman. The analogy is revealing,
for neither Bury nor Elton expected, or desired, the laborer to have knowledge of the
larger edifice.” Elton encouraged his students to “never raise his eyes beyond the detail of
his own minute area of study” (Green and Troup, 1999: 4). History is like a building:
with the correct method, a secure foundation is set on which countless scholars can
continue to build.
Whether the metaphor is constructing a building or a map, why build it? Why
should we care to have such a complete and total map of history? Bury, complaining of
the shoddy, uncritical history he sees around him, argues for a “higher, more
comprehensive and scientific” approach that will reveal “history’s practical significance”
(Stern, 1973: 213). What, then, will history do for us? According to Bury, history
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presents “true knowledge of the past…in a dry light, in order that their influence on the
present and future may be exerted in right directions” (Stern, 1973: 216). In other words,
history gives us an accurate picture of the past which is needed to make informed
decisions about how to control the future. This aspiration to social control is further
illustrated by Buckle’s complaint that history is inferior in its ability in this regard in
comparison with physics and that history has not yet produced its own Newton or Kepler
(Stern, 1973: 125). According to Buckle, history is a complicated discipline that is only
in its infancy (Stern, 1973: 126). Only when history cleans up its act will it become a
mature science with a blueprint that accurately maps the past and can be utilized to more
accurately understand the present (and control the future). Not surprisingly, at the heart of
positivist history we find the same desire for social control and power that we observed
more broadly in the project of modernity.
But from the beginning, there has been strong opposition to positivist history.
Macaulay, Carlyle and Trevelyan each cast doubt upon the epistemological pretensions of
positivist history. Macaulay points out that it is simply impossible to “record all the
slightest particulars” (Stern, 1973: 76). There are an incomprehensible amount of
particulars and to be human is to select from those particulars. The very fact that we
select things to gather together to tell a particular story denies that there is one correct
story or one set of recorded facts that are exhaustive and correct. Carlyle phrases it in
terms of events: “every single event is the offspring of not one, but of all other events”
(Stern, 1973: 95). Thus, the universal and true “experience itself would require all
knowledge to record it” (Stern, 1973: 95). Carlyle denies that any person can fully
interpret some experience or event (Stern, 1973: 96).
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The criticism at work here argues it is impossible to achieve total, universal
history. Trevelyan, however, goes further than both Macaulay and Carlyle: he elaborates
some of the results of adopting this model. For example, the goal of the universal
historical map, of which it is the individual scholar’s job to provide a piece of the puzzle
which will be later assembled to form a coherent whole, has resulted in no one finishing
the map. Because there is no assuredly correct interpretation of a particular puzzle piece,
scholars end up arguing endlessly about the puzzle pieces, but the whole remains
untouched and unfinished. “The gain in the deeper academic life of the nation must be set
off against the loss of its wider, literary life (Stern, 1973: 228)”. By getting lost in the
nitty gritty, the larger narrative story gets lost.
What do historians do then? If we reject the idea of an objective historical
account, does that imply that all histories are valid? Trevelyan suggests that “several
imperfect readings of history are better than none at all” (Stern, 1973: 230). Perhaps
stated differently, although there is no one final answer with regard to the historical
questions, multiple perspectives still give us a good idea of what is going on. Both
Macaulay and Carlyle use history as a kind of narrative that is directly related to
contemporary human issues. History in this sense is like art. The critics of positivist
history abandon its epistemological pretensions. Trevelyan makes this very clear: “the
value of history is not scientific. Its true value is educational (Stern, 1973: 223)”. History
can still do the things positivist scientists want—to help us improve life—but it cannot
figure out all the answers first.
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Logic of modernity
How are we to assess the project of modernity that has so profoundly shaped
modern life? How are we to understand the last 500 years of history and science that have
made us what we are and bequeathed us with both our successes and our problems? What
is the end point of the logic of modernity? Hans Jonas, in The Imperative of
Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, argues that our
technological power has outstripped our ability to control technology. Our power is
greater than our knowledge. If some new technology comes along, should we just add it
to the pile or stop and think about it? If we do want to think about it, how do we do so?
The fish in the water never thinks about the medium it finds itself in. Or, as Wittgenstein
puts it: “The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their
simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always
before one’s eyes.)” (Neiman, 2003: 43) Interestingly, one of Jonas’ suggestions is that
we pay attention to science fiction (1984: 30). Since it is not often immediately clear
what potential implications are, it may take fiction to help think through them.
If we apply the advice of Jonas for dealing with technology to the implications of
modernity more broadly, in this case, sociology, we then ask, what would the sociologist
of the future do? If a modernist sociology succeeded, wildly, what would its role in
society be?
In this case, a frighteningly compelling vision of the social scientist is given by
Isaac Asimov in the Foundation series. Set in the future, the story begins when
sociologists (whom Asimov calls “psycho-historians”) led by Hari Seldon have perfected
the use of statistics to the point that they can predict the future to 99.9 percent accuracy
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(in statistical parlance they get an R² of 0.999 every time and are able to extrapolate into
the future with such accurate measures of the present). As a result of this ability they
discover that society is headed for inevitable collapse. Naturally, the psycho-historians
approach the leaders of the galaxy with the disturbing news, but they are rejected. Since
the collapse is inevitable, what they attempt to do is decrease the amount of time of
recovery from the collapse. Ultimately, the psychohistorians discover that by pulling
strings and pushing buttons the shortest time to which they can reduce the period of
collapse is 1000 years.
The rest of the series follows the progress of this project. Various groups are sent
to distant planets to safeguard the scientific knowledge that can restore civilization. The
suspense of the series is generated through the twists and surprises that had been foreseen
by the psychohistorians and visits from Hari Seldon in the form of holographic messages
which appear seemingly randomly at moments of crisis. Interestingly, at a certain point a
mutant aberration screws up the foreseen plan and soon enough the recorded messages
from the psychohistorian Hari Seldon become responses to an alternate future that did not
come about.
Now, what are we to make of these psychohistorians? Do sociologists truly think
that someday they will be able to predict the future based on statistical analysis of the
present? Do they think they can control humankind through scientific law? In the case of
the father of sociology, Auguste Comte, the answer is emphatically yes.
Comte saw the success of the natural sciences and thought its methods could be
expanded to study humans. “The fundamental character of the positive philosophy is to
consider all phenomena as subject to invariable natural laws. The exact discovery of
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these laws and their reduction to the least possible number constitutes the goal of all our
efforts (Comte, 1975: 8). Applying the successful methods of the natural sciences to
human society would reveal laws similar to those that govern the natural world. Notice
that the laws govern the world. If we discover these laws, we will be effectively able to
change society. Just like the psychohistorians, Comte saw sociologists knowing how
society works and being able to tweak things to work the way they wanted. The
sociologist would sit next to the throne of the king and whisper in his ear what he needed
to say. As if this were not already an insidious vision, Comte further argues that there will
be no room for freedom in the future world controlled by sociologists: when the
sociologist speaks there will be nothing for anyone to do but shut up and obey (Coser,
1977: 5).
Both Asimov’s psychohistorians and Comte’s sociologists are practically gods.
They know all; they can righteously command the unfree humanity and produce the best
situation for their benefit. Although this Comte is clearly an extreme pole of the logic of
modernity, the history of international development all too full of the imposition of the
Big Plan of the Planners on those who they deem needs such help. Dependency Theory is
essentially the claim that the typical modernization approach is a form of colonialism.
Even if this is viewed as an overly harsh assessment, Asimov’s psychohistorians and
Comte’s sociologists do seem to represent the dark side of the project of modernity.

The Academic Division of Labor and the Proliferation of Methods
Postcolonial academia has learned to steer away from such extremes and yet, as
we saw earlier, many international development projects still fall into the same old Big
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Plan trap. Contemporary thought remains structured by the ontological and
epistemological assumptions of positivist modernity, even if it shies away from its more
frightening ethical implications. Academia especially has been structured by these
assumptions.
Positivist historians like Bury and Elton illustrate the structure of academia under
the project of modernity. It is a giant conglomeration of scholars with their noses close to
particular aspects of reality, mapping it out as carefully as possible. Elton didn’t want
scholars to be distracted by the larger whole. Their job is to focus on producing perfectly
accurate pieces which are offered to the academy for peer approval and, if deemed
worthy, added to the growing puzzle. The hope of modernity is that the pieces will all
come together to form a giant map, the map of reality. With this map finished, the
engineers move out, constructing and fixing the world, and, in the case of social
engineers, remaking humanity in the best way possible.
It is no surprise, then, that Enlightenment thinkers fastidiously worked to create
the encyclopedia that would contain all knowledge. With the encyclopedia complete it
would be a matter of distributing copies to be read by the public for their enlightenment.
With the proper knowledge they would take control of their lives, their government, their
morals, and bring about utopia.
To build or put together the complete encyclopedia requires a far reaching
division of labor. As if it were approaching a machine to figure out how the parts come
together, academia began to split itself into pieces which each resolved to do their part to
discover how the subject of their particular discipline worked and to map their parts of
the puzzle. Philosophy was the original discipline, but as mapping effort moved forward,
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different disciplines split off from philosophy and have continued to fragment as the need
for more specific information has increased. Thus, as the efforts proceed, philosophy
becomes philosophy and science - the former deals with metaphysical questions and the
latter with scientific ones. Eventually, the sciences split into science and humanities. The
sciences split further into hard sciences and social sciences. The social sciences divide up
into economics and sociology. Anthropology breaks off. Psychology breaks off. This
increasing specialization continues until we have the massive division of labor one sees
in contemporary academia.
The journal format that scholars and scientists still use is a reflection of this map
making endeavor, the division of labor that aims to fill in what is still missing in the
puzzle. The beginning of every paper is a review of the literature that aims to show where
a certain piece of the puzzle is missing, or how a previous piece of the puzzle is
problematic. The irony is that no one is putting the pieces together. The disciplines have
become so specialized they cannot or do not communicate with each other. There are too
many pieces now. No one person is capable of putting them all together. Furthermore,
because of the growing body of criticism of positivism and the project of the
Enlightenment, its goal, in the most complete form (utopia), has been largely abandoned.
The structural organization of academia has remained however. Thus the contemporary
academic finds themselves in a structure that encourages the continual creation and
assessment of puzzle pieces, without integration of the puzzle pieces.
The attack on positivism also brought recognition that the academic division of
labor was problematic. Historians like Ferdinand Braudel decided the dominant political
history of the twentieth century was inadequate and took a much more comprehensive
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approach, mixing history, sociology, economics and geography. Braudel was not alone
either. Once the pretensions of positivism came under attack, space was open for
alternate methods that had previously been denied. The proliferation of approaches and
methods is phenomenal: comparative historical sociology, economic history, political
history, social history, cultural history, literary history, phenomenology,
ethnomethodology, posthuman theory, postmodernism, structuralism, poststructuralism,
deconstructionism, postcolonialism, feminism, postmarxist theory, pragmatism, and so
forth. Implicit in all these new theories, methods and approaches are a variety of
criticisms of the project of modernity, of its mechanical view of the universe and the
corresponding view of the self and the nature of knowledge. Life was simpler when it
was all positivism.
The promise offered by the project of modernity was nothing short of utopia,
heaven on earth, the omniscience and omnipotence of God in the hands of humanity.
These dreams have faded away in the mists of knowledge and the minutiae of
specialization. Instead of the complete encyclopedia, we find Borges describing an
endless library where vagabonds wander in search of the key to understanding. Instead of
clear maps, we find Kafka cowering and T.S. Eliot wandering in the Wasteland. Reality
fragments. The self fragments. Truth and falsity multiply. The utopia promised by
modernity no longer promotes faith. Modernism (the literary movement) lamented the
death of the dreams of modernity and sought some other way to resurrect the project.
The postmodernist Calvino begins Invisible Cities with a sentiment that reflects
the failure of the project of modernity:
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In the lives of emperors there is a moment which follows pride in the
boundless extension of the territories we have conquered, and the
melancholy and relief of knowing we shall soon give up any thought of
knowing and understanding them.

It is the desperate moment when we discover that this empire, which had
seemed to us the sum of all wonders, is an endless, formless ruin, that
corruption’s gangrene has spread too far to be healed by our scepter, that
the triumph over enemy sovereigns has made us the heirs of their long
undoing. (1978: 5)

Fragmentation and Cacophony
Bauman (1991) argues modernity’s quest for order results in fragmentation. It
breaks the world into manageable pieces that can be more easily understood and
managed. If you want to understand how a car works, you disassemble it and put it back
together. Such a method has produced results: the gains of modernity are staggering. The
sheer amount of information and knowledge has exploded. Life has improved for many
as unjustified authority has been undermined. The project of Enlightenment has taken
hold: the ideals of freedom, justice and equality are spreading.
But it is rarely so simple. There have been troubling losses in the process. In the
premodern world there was a kind of security. Giddens (1991) calls this ontological
security, by which he means the premodern individual had few possibilities and hence
felt safe with their being. The fundamental categories she used to interpret and act did not
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change drastically in her lifespan. In modernity on the other hand, there is more
information and possibilities than any one individual can hope to comprehend. Giddens
shows how the individual in modernity now has to make themselves. They have to select
from a massive number of possibilities what they will do and be. This was not an option
for the premodern individual.
The unparalleled increase in information and possibilities opened up by modernity
threatens to overflow all bounds and create a situation in which life becomes muddled
and hazy. Bauman (1991) argues modernity’s quest for order ends up creating such a
tangled and complicated situation that the end result of modernity is no longer clarity but
ambiguity. Instead of polyphony modernity has produced a cacophony.
The cacophony of possibilities that has been produced by modernism suggests
there may be multiple correct truths, that truth may be made, that truth becomes. The
cacophony of possibilities and alternatives suggests there may be no single, undisputable
best world. The ambiguity created by modernity is producing a postmodern world, a
world when existential security has been undercut by seemly endless alternatives and
possibilities, which has produced a state of nihilism.
The ironic result of the attempt to get everything in its right place is that the
efforts have produced so much information and so many new classifications that it can no
longer be comprehended by one person or a larger group for that matter. The map has
turned out to be so large and complicated that no one can get a grasp on the whole.
According to Bauman, modernity, in its vigorous efforts to grasp reality, has
ultimately shown that all the grasping is making things worse. Like Princess Leia said to
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Darth Vader in Star Wars: “the tighter your grip, the more galaxies slip through your
fingers.”

Metaphors for Modernity
This discussion has been slowly collecting metaphors for the project of modernity
and those who carry it out. These metaphors come from both those who are supportive of
the project and those who think it is has failed or will fail. Together they offer an insight
into the assumptions of the project of modernity.
1. Modernity aims at making an accurate map of reality.
2. The world is a machine.
a. The machine is made of discrete building blocks.
b. Different disciplines are responsible for different aspects of the
machine or map.
c. The final product comes together like a puzzle or like a clock.
d. Math is the language of reality.
e. When it is finished, humanity will be both omniscient and
omnipotent—like God—and be able to bring about utopia.
3. Modernity is gardening society.

We could spend more time teasing out interesting metaphors used by or used to
describe modernity, but those we have found are sufficient. Where do these metaphors
leave us? They show, at bottom, the project of modernity assumes that there is one
unchanging reality that underlies the world and human experience. At first this appears a
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fairly mundane observation. It is not immediately apparent why that is such a
controversial claim.
What if, instead of a hidden eternal truth behind a façade that can be mapped,
reality is a fractal? Fractals are infinitely complex. If you zero in on any part you discover
new shapes. Keep zooming in and there are different shapes. Zoom out, same results. The
fractal is never exhausted. It is like a tree. From a distance it appears to be a tree. But as
one moves closer one sees a branch. Move closer, a leaf. Then one could zoom in closer
and see cytoplasm, then individual cells, then atoms, then neutrons and electrons. Unlike
the tree which seems to have terminal points when a particular perspective is forced to an
extreme, a fractal has no extremes. Zoom in, zoom out—there are an infinite amount of
shapes. If the disciplines that make up academia are working on different parts of the
fractal, with different reference points, then for all their fruitful description of the fractal
no ultimately coherent whole will ever emerge. This does not mean what they are saying
is wrong, just that they can never get the complete picture. Furthermore, they may arrive
at legitimate contractions.
If we take history into account we could think of the fractal as a wriggling
fractal—moving slowly over time like a polyp. One could pick a particular part of the
fractal to map, only to discover ten years later it has shifted and the map one was creating
is no longer accurate. Twenty years on is it quite warped. One hundred years on the map
no longer matches the fractal.
This fractal model of reality is attractive. It would explain the lack of success on
the part of the social sciences to generate a coherent picture of the whole. It would
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explain how different approaches and perspectives are producing different, sometimes
contradictory, results.

In Western thought, at bottom, there is one unchanging reality. Can we learn what
it is? The Greeks, beginning with Plato, seemed to think so. Through contemplation we
discover the true forms of the things in the world. Modernity, beginning with Descartes,
agrees with the Greeks. The project of modernity is the modern version of Plato’s theory
of forms, but with a method it claims will dispel the illusions and reveal the eternal truth
behind the façade.
We have already seen what happens if one believes 1) that there is one
underlying, unchanging reality that anchors the world we live in and 2) we can discover it
though the scientific method. The physical sciences did such a good job at figuring out
how things worked and producing wonderful new toys like clocks that soon enough
everything in the world was believed to be capable of being disassembled like a machine
and a massive academic system was formed to discover the truth behind the façade.
There have been enough problems with the system, however, to suggest that there
are good reasons for abandoning these assumptions or at least seriously limiting their
reach. Within the physical sciences themselves, there are indications that at bottom reality
is not an unchanging Same. Quantum mechanics shows that on a molecular level
everything is much more chaotic than originally thought. Nevertheless, for the purposes
of this thesis, the real problem has been the application of these assumptions to the social
sciences.
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The (1) first problem is that the social sciences have never achieved the
systematic totality aimed at by modernity. They haven’t produced the same results. This
could be because there are simply too many variables. Or, it could be that the ontological
assumption that at bottom there is one true reality is wrong. The fractal model might be a
better fit.
The (2) second problem is that political decisions are being based on information
produced by the social sciences that is perceived to be scientific and hence correct.
The first problem concerns whether the ontological assumption of modernity is
correct or not. The second, however, is much more dangerous. It concerns the real world
effects of assuming this kind of ontology holds true of the social sciences. I suggest that
the failure of the social sciences to deliver in the political arena (2), shows the problem of
these ontological assumptions (1).
In chapter 1 we already examined a case of the application of these ontological
assumptions and methods to a social problem—international development. Ultimately I
think these efforts will remain less effective if they continue to hold hard and fast to
traditional approach used in the social sciences. I take this failure to indicate the need to
rethink our fundamental ontology. Chapter 3 will turn to this task.
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CHAPTER 3: RETHINKING ONTOLOGY: NIETZSCHE AND HEIDEGGER
The reason the project of modernity hasn’t worked as smoothly as it aimed to may
be simply that the social sciences are nascent sciences that need to hone their methods.
Contrarily I suggest that the evidence is already overwhelming: social phenomena are
different from the kinds of phenomena studied by the natural sciences. As such, the social
sciences require a different approach than that offered by the natural sciences.
Recognizing these differences is essential to more effective international development
efforts. Since the natural sciences have proven so effective and successful, it is hard for
social scientists to pull themselves away from it. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger are
pivotal in helping comprehend why this is necessary.
With this in mind, this section examines the philosophical rebellion of Nietzsche
and Heidegger. Both argue that modernity has failed. Despite new inventions and longer
life, modernity has made life meaningless and nihilistic. To overcome this nihilism,
Nietzsche and Heidegger go back to the Greeks and argue that Socrates and Plato sent the
West off on the wrong track. Both argue ontology is the starting point for understanding
the problematic aspects of modernity.

Nietzsche and Ontology
Ontology is the study of being. At first glance, it is hard to understand why
ontology matters. This is not surprising, Heidegger argues in his watershed work, Being
and Time (1962), that we have forgotten the question of being (1). Heidegger points out
that we don’t even know how to handle issues concerning being. We tend to assume what
is just is, and forget that a particular state of affairs could be different. Originally, the
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question of being concerned whether reality was constant becoming or simply being.
With Socrates and Plato, being was the victor. This was the foundation of Western
thought and, according to Nietzsche, a mistake.
For Nietzsche, as he argues in Twilight of the Idols, the entire Western tradition
since Socrates has been driven by hatred of becoming (Kaufmann, 1982: 479). If
something changed it was deemed transitory and therefore untrue and unreliable. For
Socrates reason will enable us to discover what is unchanging behind shifting, misleading
appearances.
But Socratic forms of reason, according to Nietzsche, result in nothing less than a
process of mummification. He thinks western thought has consistently sought to stop
movement, to form concepts that are universal across appearances. It sees change, but
wants to slow and stop change in order to get a clear view of what is going on. “When
these honorable idolators of concepts worship something, they kill it and stuff it; they
threaten the life of everything they worship” (Kaufmann, 1982: 479).
At the heart of reason is the principle that whatever becomes has no being. Only
what has being, what is without change is real. This mistrust of becoming results in
mistrust of the senses which reveal to us “becoming, passing away, and change
(Kaufmann, 1982: 481)”. It is ironic that that which allows us to see and interact with the
world, the human body and the human senses, is depreciated for abstract reason.
Nietzsche mocks those who think the real world is signs, logic, numbers and abstract
symbols, and not the world we experience with our bodies. The abstract, distant, empty
God of Aristotle—a product of the logic and process of reason—shows the absurdity of
this kind of rationality.

58

Why is it so natural for us then to think this way? Nietzsche’s answer is that being
is embedded in our language. Being is “projected by thought” and “pushed underneath, as
a cause” (483). Nietzsche goes so far as to suggest we can’t get rid of god (and the
corresponding idea of the true world) because we are held captive by our faith in
grammar. In other words, our language is a way of freezing becoming. It creates
boundaries and limits that help us function and move in the world.

The True World
Once being and reason have become the standards for what constitutes
knowledge, the next step is to see this world, a place of becoming, as an illusion that
somehow hides or covers what is real. This is exactly what Plato’s allegory of the cave
points to: you cannot trust this world; you must learn to leave it and see the true world.
Reason is what aids you in the process of throwing off the world of becoming and seeing
the world of being.
Nietzsche gives a brief “History of an Error” to describe how this fundamental
understanding of the “true world” has changed over time (485):
1.

First, the true world is accessible to the philosophers and sage through
reason. This is Plato’s model.

2.

Second, the true world is out of reach for now, but promised to those
who do what is required to obtain it. This is Christianity.

3.

Third, the true world is something we cannot access, but the still impels
us. This is Kant’s model of the true world.
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4.

Fourth, the true world because it is now considered unattainable begins
loosing it’s power.

5.

Finally, the idea of the true world dies. Nietzsche points out this also
means the idea the apparent world is false also dies.

What are we left with? This brings us to the reason Nietzsche first began looking
at the issue of ontology at all: Nietzsche found the world of the late nineteenth century
was slipping into a money grubbing, meaningless morass. He sought to diagnose this
malaise and overcome it.
Thus, on the one hand we are left with nihilism. “What does nihilism mean? That
the highest values devaluate themselves.” (1968: 9) Paralysis comes when the guiding
values and norms that oriented and were instinctual to humanity have become discredited
or doubted or have simply run their time. The “center of gravity” is lost (1968: 20) and
what is left is utter disorientation. Another way Nietzsche says this is in the proclamation
of the visionary madman: “God is dead (1974: 181)”. By this Nietzsche means that faith
in unifying absolutes, God and God’s replacement, Reason, is no longer tenable. The
result of losing the big picture is instructive:

How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire
horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun?
Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we
not plunging continually? Backwards, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is
there still any up or down?

(Nietzsche, 1974: 181)
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On the other hand, the long tradition of thinking about reason on the terms
outlined above is coming to an end. Because it is entrenched in our grammar and our
basic ways of thinking, it will still be a long time before something else will take its
place. What “something else” though? What alternatives are there?
The question of what takes the place of the inherited Platonic understanding of
reason and the world is one that drives postmodernity. While it is not limited to this
question, it certainly has to deal with it. The recognition that the Platonic model is
breaking apart has produced multiple responses like Pragmatism, Phenomenology,
Deconstruction, and Post-structuralism. The last two are intellectual descendents of
Phenomenology, which is similar, though not the same, to Pragmatism.
I take Heidegger to be the philosopher who rose up to respond to the Nietzschean
challenge, so that is where we turn now.

Heidegger and Ontology
Heidegger agreed with Nietzsche that the nihilism of modernity is caused by the
slow unmasking of the project of being. By searching for being, more often than not a
particular way of being was taken as ultimate being. The search for the final answer
seemed a dangerous dream that risked systemizing all of humanity under scientific
categories that denied the particularities needed for meaningful life. The end of taking
being as the ultimate is the assembly line. To make his argument, Heidegger uses a
method called phenomenology. Phenomenology entails describing real life experience as
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it is experienced. This may sound trivial, but phenomenology often reveals important
details that have been overlooked or taken for granted.
Phenomenology involves describing regular events in fuller detail than we might
ordinarily try to understand what is going on. So let’s take Heidegger’s example of
hammering. In the act of hammering, what goes on? To the carpenter in his shop as he is
hammering, what does it feel like? Is he thinking about the angle and force of swing that
will best nail in the nail? Is he thinking about the movement of his wrist as he hammers?
Heidegger’s answer is, of course not. Heidegger draws attention to when one is absorbed
in a task like hammering one doesn’t think or consider “hammering” in ways a Platonic
conception of hammering would require. For everyday hammering there is no need to
think in terms of systematic principles. For the proficient hammerer, hammering occurs
almost without thought. It is almost as if the hammer is a part of the body, a part of the
hand. Sports are another example. For anyone who plays a sport regularly and well, this
experience of acting without thinking is really clear. As a skilled basketball player moves
around the court, they don’t think “oh I must be move my legs this way and hold my
arms out that way…now I must jump—uh oh, he’s going to block me! I have to readjust,
move my left hand to the left…” I was recently playing basketball when an inexperienced
player quite seriously told me his game plan: “when I get open, pass me the ball.” This
was perplexing, because this is common knowledge in basketball. There are complex
strategies to get open, and even those are not something the player is explicitly aware of,
rather, for the player, they just happen as if responding to various strategies is just
natural. In a smooth flowing game, the skilled players doesn’t think about what they are
supposed to be doing, they just do it.
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This also explains why in the 2006 baseball season Alex Rodriquez, one of
baseballs best hitters, suffered a terrible hitting slump and was told he was thinking too
much. This is absolutely correct according to Heidegger. The habits that make a player
good are body knowledge. It is knowledge that is an integral part of how the body moves
and acts in the world. Plato denies the extent to which such knowledge plays a role in
human life. Yet, most of our knowledge occurs in this form. We might not realize this
because we are often aware that we are thinking when we are thinking. We recognize the
act. We don’t recognize that there is a kind of knowledge in how we use language or how
we play a sport because such knowledge is not thought, it is acted out.
Let’s return to the hammer. If while one is in the process of hammering the
hammer breaks, the absorbed action comes to an end. The carpenter now has to stop and
look at the hammer in a way he wasn’t previously. He has to work through possibilities
of what happened and how the hammer can be fixed. Now the carpenter may be using the
kind of reason Plato extolled. Heidegger calls the way the world appears when one is
looking at it in this abstract, distant manner “present-to-hand.” When one is engaged with
the world and involved in it, the world appears as “ready-at-hand.” Which way is more
common, engaging with the world in a ready-at-hand manner or in a present-to-hand
manner? Heidegger argues the majority of our actions and knowledge take place in a
ready-at-hand manner.
Heidegger also argues the present-to-hand is only possible if there first exists a
world that an individual acts within in a ready-at-hand manner. The present-to-hand is a
withdrawal from a world of activity—it would make no sense to stand back from a
disruption in the meaningful significations that make up activity in a world if there were
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not first such a web of significations. Here Heidegger is breaking with the tradition in
philosophy which has followed Descartes in thinking of the individual self as the one
thing of which we can be sure. Heidegger rejects the atomism this implies because there
is no phenomenological evidence that the individual exists in some neutral state that can
see objects in the present-to-hand way before existing in a world they are familiar with in
a ready-at-hand manner. In opposition to Descartes, Heidegger argues the Platonic way of
looking at the world is only possible if preceded by an experience of the world as readyat-hand. The ready-at-hand is prior to the present-to-hand.

World
Heidegger thinks the problem with much of western thought is that it has
forgotten that the present-to-hand is only possible if there is first the ready-to-hand. The
ready to hand occurs within a world—the contextual, complicated place that Plato said
had to be ignored to achieve true knowledge. Thus, in international development,
attention is focused on those things which can be clearly quantified, measured and
expressed. This forgets the kind of knowledge that people use in everyday life. It takes a
complicated and flexible situation in which individuals function according to complex,
often unstated but understood social norms, and reduces it to a more comprehensible
model that greatly simplifies what is occurring.
The phenomenon of ‘world’ is an attempt to get away from such models and, more
philosophically, thinking in Cartesian terms of a mind that floats apart from the foreign world.
Heidegger points to what lived life is like: while there are times we look at things abstractly and
seem separated from them, most of the time we exist with objects and people and function in and
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among them with a closeness and familiarity that is a sharp contrast to the abstract thinking self
of Kant and Descartes. I write with my pencil and type on this keyboard without having to think
abstractly about it, I just use it. What Heidegger is doing with this description is attempting to
erase the easy divide between the subject and the object. Instead, we live in a ‘horizon’ that is
‘disclosed’ to us. We live within a world with objects that are revealed to us, appear, or in other
words, are ‘disclosed’ in a certain way. There is no possibility for abstraction, for the kind of
autonomous self Kant describes, without the more fundamental relation in and among objects
and people. As such, the way I think about the world is not just a function of accessing the world,
but also of accessing it from a certain perspective—this is what traditional thought forgets, as
Young puts it, “the perspectival character of our basic perspective on things” (2002: 29). We live
in a particular time and in a particular culture and for the most part adapt those ways of dividing
up the flux and acting. But knowledge is not just a function of culture and conditioning, as a
historicist may argue. While we have certain filters through which we interpret reality, we cannot
make reality whatever we want it to be—objects limit the possibilities of our interpretations of
reality. Thus, Heidegger is not a relativist. Much of what he is after is to describe the tension
between the reality of objects and the filters we put on them to understand them. His point is that
there is not a list of attributes to a particular object which we can find out, for the objects always
overflow our understanding, they are always more than what we see and experience.

Implications: Fuzzy Ontology
For Heidegger, one of the neglected issues of western thought is the question of
being: what does it mean for a thing to be? This question makes sense coming from the
background we have also seen with Nietzsche who argued western thought had
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condemned becoming in favor of being right off the bat. Heidegger thinks Nietzsche is on
to something and thinks if we phenomenologically examine our everyday experience we
quickly discover the abstract form of thinking which has been the standard of what
constitutes knowledge since Plato is only possible because we live in a world that shapes
us through language and gives us all kinds of body knowledge.
This particular theme in Heidegger’s thought has been most developed by
Merleau-Ponty and Hubert Dreyfus. Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception took
the framework of Heidegger and focused on the role of the body. The term “body
knowledge” I used above comes from Merleau-Ponty’s work. Dreyfus builds on both
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty and argues that when we first learn it is in terms of rules
(Flyvberg, 2001). We learn steps that produce certain results. The non-expert has to think
about the rules and how they fit into a particular situation as she goes. But as she
becomes more adapt at something (say surgery) she no longer thinks about what she is
doing, but comes to simply respond to the situation. No longer does she think, her body
responds.
Once we recognize body knowledge—knowledge that can adjust and function in a world
of becoming—is the precondition for abstract knowledge, we can now imagine rethinking what it
means to be. As we have seen, for Plato to be is to be something objective, explicit, a-contextual
and systematic. Furthermore, it remains constant and doesn’t change. To be is to be a thing.
But if we recognize the derivative form of knowledge this constitutes, and consider the
alternative, what would it mean to be something that becomes?
It means to be is to be fuzzy. No longer is the object fixed into one set of meanings, but it
can have different meanings depending on the situation. This also implies it can have different
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meanings in different cultures. A Buddha statue is a god in one culture, a novelty in another, and
meaningless rock to another. Are all these different meanings “valid”? Are they legitimate
interpretations?
For Heidegger the world we are born into shapes the way we understand and categorize
the objects in our world. Such understandings are limited by the inherent possibilities of what an
object is. For example, the object we call a “table” can have different meanings: it could be seen
as firewood, as something to block a door, as something to eat on, as art, etc. It cannot be a
computer however. What a table is ontologically is “fuzzy.” This “is” is not a static core—there
is not something exhaustively discoverable at the middle. Fuzzy ontology implies there are limits
to what a thing can be. A table is never a computer. It can never compute.
Bauman (1993) argues thus fuzzy ontology is not relative. Because of the historical
dominance of the idea that to be is to be in the permanent Platonic sense, when that model is
denied it is assumed that all is relative. If it is not universal and constant then it is relative and
fleeting. But this doesn’t follow. Fuzzy ontology has a limited possibility of things it can be, but
that penumbra of possibilities is always nebulous. We can never figure out all the possibilities.

Controlling the Ambiguous Fuzzy
Heidegger sees the history of philosophy since Plato as a history of attempts to stem the
shiftiness of becoming, to control fuzzy ontology, to totalize and systematize it. He wants to
move away from the Cartesian split between the subject and object which he sees culminating in
the nihilism. When the world is viewed as an object humans can comprehend and control
humanity ceases to see it as a force that we must work with and respect. Humanity comes to see
the world as a resource it can use, instead of a partner it can work with. Heidegger wants to find
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another way of approaching the world that lets it be instead of taking it over. As Caputo puts it,
Heidegger defines ‘thinking’ (his alternative way of approaching the world) “in opposition to
willing,” which is the “imposition of human subjectivity upon things” (1987: 98).
According to Heidegger the flux, reality, is infinitely rich. Every individual and
culture has to approach that flux and appropriate it to make sense of it and function in the
world. But philosophy has been searching for the final answer. As Julien Young puts it,
in searching for universal traits and absolute understanding, metaphysical thinking
forgets it is making a selection “from the smorgasbord of attributes possessed by reality
itself.” It “elevates (what is in fact) a particular disclosure to tyrannical status, a status
which allow the possibility of no other reality-revealing horizon.” Thus, “as Heidegger
uses the term, the error that is metaphysics [traditional thought] may be defined as the
absolutization of some (of any) horizon of disclosure” (2002: 29).

The two approaches Heidegger contrasts, willing and thinking, represent respectively
taking over reality for whatever ends we find useful and letting be. The former is obvious to us—
science does this, it approaches objects to understand them and to learn how they can be used.
Heidegger doesn’t think this is bad. When it does become dangerous is when science or any
other way of understanding the world claims predominance over all others. Thus his work is an
attempt to restore the understanding of the complexity of reality and the need to be open to other
possibilities. Instead of limiting reality to one, absolute, propositionally static understanding,
Heidegger wants to describe the possibility of letting reality be, letting it show up, instead of
forcing it this way and that.

68

CHAPTER 4: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The paradigm that flows out of Nietzsche and Heidegger is radically different from the
traditional philosophical one that informs the project of modernity and both the natural and social
sciences. The tradition values knowledge, abstract concepts and systematic approaches.
Nietzsche and Heidegger show that knowledge is not continuous or even conscious most of the
time. Time and perspective are seen as necessary conditions for experience and efforts to escape
them dishonest. The individual is not seen as a Cartesian subject, but rather embedded within a
culture that shapes how she sees the world.
According to Nietzsche and Heidegger the fundamental assumption upon which
the entire Western tradition has been built is that behind the façade of appearances there
is an underlying, eternal order. What if the rug is pulled out from under this fundamental
assumption that there is a static reality that humanity must discover? How would the
social sciences change if Heidegger and Nietzsche are right and reality is not simply a
static one?
Rorty argues western thought is based on the task of finding ways to accurately
mirror the underlying, eternal order: “The picture which holds traditional philosophy [and
science] captive is that of the mind as a great mirror” (1980: 12). The data gathered in
research is meant to be as accurate a representation of reality as possible. But if what the
mirror reflects is not the one true reality, but a perspective on reality or a part of reality,
then the truth is no longer eternal, universal truth, but a truth or a part of truth. It actually
is not much of a problem unless a truth is taken as the truth. This becomes especially
dangerous when a particular model is taken as complete, universal truth—or even
something approximating it. Foucault spent his career showing that this is exactly what
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has been happening in modernity: particular truths are being taken as the ultimate truths
and universally imposed on everything that doesn’t fit. The particular perspective
“discovered” through scientific methods justifies hammering everything that varies from
the norm into the norm.
If there is no static reality accessible through the right methods, then systematic
thinking can never exhaust all there is to reality. Nietzsche made this point forcefully: “I
mistrust all systematizers, the will to systematize is a lack of integrity” (1982: 470). I
argued in Chapter 2 that reality is often taken to be like a machine comprised of parts, or
a giant puzzle comprised of pieces. If this were so, it would make sense to have a
thoroughly systematic approach which would methodically examine all the pieces and
how they go together, gathering details until they are all gathered. Nietzsche’s point is
that no amount of systematic study will ever produce the ultimate, finished product.
There are always more details, more perspectives, more truths. Again, the danger is in
taking a particular perspective as the universal truth. It reflects a lack of integrity.
This also helps explain why Nietzsche attacked Socrates. Socrates’ error,
according to Nietzsche, “consists of raising analysis and rationality into the most
important mode of operation for human activity, and allowing these to dominate our view
of human activity” (Flyvberg, 2001: 23). Notice that Nietzsche does not want to throw
rationality away, rather he rejects the hegemony of rationality. It is one “mode of
operation for human activity,” not the only mode of operation however. “Rationality may
endanger sensitivity to context, experience, and intuition” among other things (Flyvberg,
2001: 23). In section 3, I examined Heidegger’s description of rationality and analytic
thought as a mode of understanding that only exists when the life world breaks down.
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Everyday life is not rational in the analytic sense. It is not surprising that this bias
towards the analytic has produced an atomistic model for human behavior in rational
choice theory. For Heidegger and Nietzsche, rational choice theory is an idiocy. It turns
humans into robots, something they simply are not:

"What? Do we really want to permit existence to be degraded for us
like this--reduced to a mere exercise for a calculator and an indoor diversion
for mathematicians? Above all one should not divest existence of its rich
ambiguity...
"--an interpretation that permits counting, calculating, weighing,
seeing, and touching, and nothing more--that is a crudity and naivete,
assuming that it is not a mental illness, an idiocy...
"A 'scientific' interpretation of the world, as you understand it, might
therefore still be one of the most stupid of all possible interpretations of the
world, meaning that it would be the poorest in meaning...
"An essentially mechanical world would be an essentially meaningless
world."

(Nietzsche, 1974: 335)

The mechanical, meaningless world leads to nihilism and, according to Nietzsche,
needs to be overcome. “As an antidote to Socrates, Nietzsche suggests that the central
task for human beings is not the Socratic one of making knowledge cerebral and rational
but instead one of making it bodily and intuitive” (Flyvberg, 2001: 23). Any system of
explanation that takes the rational and analytical as the essential element, especially when
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dealing with humans, simply misses out on the diversity of what it is to be human. What
is needed are ways of thinking that avoid such reductionism and attempt to think about
humanity and the world in ways that recognize the complexity and different modes of
operation of humanity. This is exactly what Scott argues. Indeed, as we saw in chapter 1,
it is in rubber-hits-the-road projects like international development where these issues are
particularly evident.

International Development
So what then about international development? What if the rug is pulled out from
under this fundamental assumption that there is a static reality that humanity must
discover? Easterly phrases it the most provocatively: “The right plan is to have no plan”
(2006: 5). Of course, he doesn’t mean that there shouldn’t be any plan at all, rather that
international development is too often treated like a “technical engineering problem” in
which the most important thing is to figure out what is going on first and then to descend
on the problem and fix it (6). Like Postma, Easterly thinks development projects are not
like fixing a car. To put it in ontological terms, it is not a matter of simply figuring out all
the variables involved—there are too many variables, too many parts, changing too fast
to create an accurate map.
Problems in development are a shifting target. An NGO may change one thing
only to find it completely changes everything else and requires a complete overhaul of
plans. Social scientists steeped in traditional methods based on the problematic
ontological and epistemological assumptions are likely to find themselves focusing on
figuring out what the problem is in their ivory towers instead of solving problems as they
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arise. Scholarship wants to figure out the problem before attempting to solve it. Yet for
many development problems it requires a kind of flexibility that doesn’t assume it is a
matter of understanding the variables first. It requires what Scott calls Mētis.
For Scott, approaches based on the ontological and epistemological assumptions
of modernity tend to create maps, models and simplifications that miss out on the
complexity of development issues. What can be done to overcome the “thin, formulaic
simplifications imposed through the agency or state power” (or even NGOs) that have
caused for many failures? (1998:309). The first step is to recognize that “formal order…is
always and to some considerable degree parasitic on informal processes, which the
formal scheme does not recognize, without which it could not exist, and which it alone
cannot create or maintain (1998:310). Such formal order is often an imposition aimed at
“control and appropriation” (1998:311). What is needed is a form of knowledge and an
approach towards development that Scott calls mētis. Scott chooses the Greek word mētis
to contrast episteme and techne, formal, technical knowledge. Mētis is then “a wide array
of practical skills and acquired intelligence [that responds] to a constantly changing
natural and human environment” (1998: 313). Thus, as we have seen, technical scientific
knowledge is like grammar. It offers a simplified version of a language and some rules
that do seem to be at work. But knowing the grammar of a language does not constitute
knowing a language. The actual spoken language is mētis. Like Wittgenstein, Scott
argues we learn the lived, actual language first and only later come to learn the formal
grammar—if we learn it at all (1998: 319). We only take the grammatical rules to be the
essential part of language because we conceptually ignore all the practical lived aspects
of mētis.
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Bent Flyvberg carries on a similar discussion in Making Social Science Matter:
Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it Can Succed Again. Like Scott, Flyvberg argues
western thought privileges conceptual thought over practical knowledge. Like Scott he
looks to the Greeks, but instead of Mētis Flyvberg opts for the Greek term Phronesis.
Both Mētis and Phronesis refer to practical knowledge. While Flyvberg does not focus on
international development, his suggestions parallel Scotts. If there is not a single reality
to be mapped, but rather a flexible ever shifting reality, the danger is not inaccurate
measurement but assuming a good measurement is fixed. Flyvberg follows Heidegger in
arguing reality is not fixed being but changing becoming. What should a social scientist
who is sensitive to a complex, ever changing social world do to best approach social
problems?
1. Focus on values (2001: 130)
a. Flyvberg argues that our values affect which parts of the shifting social
world appear as relevant. Instead of seeking to avoid values (which is
impossible), Flyvberg argues social scientists should be open about
what values guide research. This is the same thing Bourdieu argues for
when he argues sociology needs to be reflexive (1992)
2. Placing power at the core of analysis (2001: 131)
a. Since there is not one single reality to be mirrored as accurately as
possible, it is inevitable that particular interpretations and perspectives
will result. Such perspectives are not a failure, rather the necessary
simplifications of an ever changing reality. As such, suggestions for
how to deal with the social world involve an element of power. Local
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groups might not share the same perspective as aid agencies. Instead of
assuming that scholars or aid agencies understand the issues perfectly,
there needs to be a recognition that there is no complete knowledge
and that an solution will represent an imposition of power from one
group on another. This is not something that is avoidable, but
acknowledging the role of power is essential to ethical action.
3. Getting close to reality (132)
a. Like Easterly and Scott, Flyvberg argues that practical knowledge
takes place in close contact with the issues in question. Conceptual
knowledge achieved through distant learning (through historical
analysis, statistics, etc.) may be helpful, but cannot precede the kind of
practical knowledge gained from being closed the reality in question.
The ivory tower often does not know better than the locals.
4. Looking at practice before discourse (134)
a. Too often scholars depend on “the literature” to introduce them to the
issues involved at the expense of real world experience. Again, the
map cannot supersede reality.
5. Dialoguing with a polyphony of voices (139)
a. Planners assume that they are gaining access to better, more accurate
knowledge. As such there is a risk of shutting out other voices. If
reality is ontologically fixed, the most accurate explanation is the best
and all other perspectives must yield. If, as I have argued, Heidegger
and Nietzsche are right in suggesting there is no one final, fixed
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reality, but rather reality is always changing then multiple perspectives
are preferable, because they can yield a “fuzzy” picture instead of a
too narrow one.

These are just some of the suggestions Flyvberg offers for how to improve the
social sciences once the ontological and epistemological assumptions are recognized to
be problematic. Scott, Easterly, Postma, Kaplan and many others have argued that it is
time to rethink the approach that is taken to international development. I have covered
enough of their criticisms and suggestions to give a general idea how international
development can be improved. It is not my purpose to try to tease out from their
suggestions a new general model for approaching development issues. Nor will I attempt
to provide a fully fleshed out picture of practical knowledge. Both of these efforts are
beyond the scope of this thesis. I refer to reader to the works of the many thinkers who
have already done much towards these ends.
I have argued that international development is a part of the project of modernity
which is based on problematic assumptions about epistemology and ontology. I have
attempted to show how deeply enrooted these assumptions are in contemporary thought.
These deeply entrenched assumptions help explain how, even though many development
projects (and many social scientists generally) recognize the dangers of colonialism, often
produce results that are disturbingly similar to the organizational efforts of the colonial
period. I have also suggested that while Scott and Kaplan and others recognize this, the
problem is deeper than they suggest. I think Nietzsche and Heidegger are correct that it
strikes right into the heart of the Western tradition, all the way back to Socrates and
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Plato—it starts with the ontological assumption that there is one true reality. There are
many thinkers who have explored how to overcome this assumption and what scholastic
and scientific research would look like in the aftermath. These thinkers are not all in
agreement about what this would entail, but they all agree that it would require becoming
more flexible and open-minded, more willing to cut across disciplines, less focused on
method and more inclined to accept different perspectives. If the problematic aspects of
international development are to be improved (as far as it is possible), the structure of
academia needs to be changed. It is built on a series of assumptions that are highly
problematic. Despite the many voices in opposition to these assumptions, the edifice they
are a foundation for remains largely unchanged. These assumptions have shaped the
structure of academia. It is not surprising to see that well meaning scholars and aid
agencies repeat the same old mistakes. The majority of the scholars and scientists who
are products of this edifice reflect fully its assumptions. The structure discourages them
from thinking broadly and reinforced the Cartesian anxiety that leads to methodological
fetishism.

Despite the criticisms of thinkers like Mills, Bellah and Habermas, sociology
continues to be largely undemocratic and hermetically sealed off from the humanities.
Mills attributes the staying power of the sociologist as technician to the ease that new
social technicians can be trained in the “fine little mill of Statistical ritual” (1959, 72). It
is much easier and less time consuming to train students to run regression analysis
models than to make them competent philosophers and historians conversant in the many
disciplines. Furthermore, the complicated nuances of comparative and historical issues
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and approaches precludes the kind of clear eyed, straight forwards results that can be
produced through statistical analysis. In terms of comprehensibility for the non expert,
the interaction of clearly defined variables with a frank assessment of the degree of
confidence in our results are the best way to get information that can be digested quickly
and acted upon by those in power.
There is too much prestige, too much inertia, too much facility buoying abstracted
empiricism to promote the kind of change Mills, Bellah and Habermas hope for. As Mills
pointed out, scientific thought tends to see itself as natural. By this he means that it often
doesn’t understand the philosophical assumption it is built on. Only by exposing the
ontological and epistemological flaws that underlie Western scientific thought does it
become clear why there is a need to return to a democratic comparative historical
approach. While there are morally compelling reasons for doing so, these morally
compelling reason can be roped back into the fold. They can be taken for a need for
better—and yet still fundamentally the same—science. Technology can be taken as the
solution to technology. Only when the basic assumptions are attacked do the moral issues
show up in a different light.
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